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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION:
A REPLY TO JUDGE POSNER
JOHN J. DONOHUE IIIt
I have profited greatly from reading Judge Posner's review1 of my
initial Essay, Is Title VII Efficient?2 As usual, he has raised a number
of thought-provoking issues that must be addressed if we are to make
headway in resolving the difficult theoretical and empirical issues posed
by employment discrimination legislation. In Part I of this reply, I will
discuss Judge Posner's specific criticisms of my theoretical analysis and
then discuss the results of a very rough cost-benefit analysis of Title
VII3 that incorporates Judge Posner's concerns. The details of the cost-
benefit analysis are supplied in an Appendix. Part II will then offer
some preliminary thoughts on Judge Posner's empirical assessment of
Title VII.
I. THE CRITIQUE OF My THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
My Essay examined the Beckerian argument4 that, in a world in
which discrimination against minorities is based on animus, we do not
need, nor do we profit from having, legislation that prohibits discrimi-
nation. This view is based on the theoretical conclusion that, in the
short run, the interference with competitive labor markets caused by
antidiscrimination legislation is harmful, and, in the long run, it is un-
necessary because discriminators will go the way of all nonprofit maxi-
mizers-out of business. My Essay questioned this "efficiency attack"
on Title VII by showing that, while antidiscrimination legislation may
t Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Research Fellow, Ameri-
can Bar Foundation. B.A. 1974, Hamilton College; J.D. 1977, Harvard Law School;
M.A. 1982, M.Phil. 1984, Ph.D. (economics) 1986, Yale University. I would like to
thank Ronald Allen, Joseph Altonji, Ian Ayres, William Felstiner, Herbert Kritzer,
Judge Richard Posner, Peter Siegelman, and David Van Zandt for their helpful
comments.
' Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 517
(1987).
2 Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)(17)
(1982).
" See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1415-20 (discussing G. BECKER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971)).
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be inefficient in the short run, it does have an offsetting advantage: it
will tend to eliminate discriminators more quickly than the free market
would. I take it that Judge Posner does not dispute my theoretical dem-
onstration of this proposition. He does question, however, whether it is
economically efficient to speed up the process of achieving a discrimina-
tion-free labor market. 5
A. Will Title VII End Discrimination Too Quickly?
While Judge Posner would certainly agree that we are better off if
employers who harbor racial animus are squeezed out of the market, he
offers two reasons for believing that the cost of moving to this happy
condition through government intervention may be too great. In es-
sence, Judge Posner argues that my assessment of the efficiency of Title
VII would be altered if I explicitly considered the costs of administer-
ing the Act and the added costs of adjustment that it imposes in driving
discriminators from the market more quickly than would occur under
laissez faire.6 Subsections (1) and (2) will discuss each of these factors.
I will then try to incorporate them in a very rough cost-benefit analysis
of the Act, which I discuss in Part I (B).
1. The Costs of Administering Title VII
In Figure 3 of my Essay,7 I demonstrated that Title VII would
reduce wealth initially from SW 2 to SW 3 because the Act interfered
with employer preferences. In the long run, however, the Act would
generate the benefit of elevating welfare to SW 1 more quickly, since
discriminators would be driven from the market more rapidly. I then
concluded that, if the long-run benefits (b) exceeded the short-run costs
(a), the Act was efficient.8 Judge Posner quite correctly notes, however,
that administering Title VII is costly.' My rough estimate of these costs
is $300 million per year based on 6000 suits alleging racial discrimina-
tion in employment.
See Posner, supra note 1, at 518.
e Id. at 518-20.
7 Donohue, supra note 2, at 1424.
8 Id. at 1427.
' Posner, supra note 1, at 518.
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Figure 3









2. The Added Costs of Adjustment Under Title VII
Judge Posner's second point is, as he notes, more subtle. Adhering
to Becker's analogy that discrimination can be thought of as similar to
the transportation costs that deter nations from engaging in interna-
tional trade, Judge Posner contends that a law forbidding discrimina-
tion would be as ill-advised as a law requiring two nations to engage in
trade when the transportation costs between them made such trade
inefficient.'0 But this analogy is flawed. In Judge Posner's international
trade example, the level of trade is assumed to be at some equilibrium
level based on the existing size of transportation costs. Unless these
costs changed, there would be no economic force that would induce
changes in the level of international trade, nor would there be any ad-
vantage in the government trying to depart from this equilibrium con-
10 Id. at 519.
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dition. In the Beckerian world, however, discrimination is a dise-
quilibrium phenomenon: over time, discriminators would be driven
from the market because they failed to minimize costs."i In this case,
government intervention is potentially useful because it can speed up
this process.
Judge Posner next analogizes Title VII to a law requiring the
international maritime industry to adopt a new and more efficient tech-
nology.' 2 This is a more appropriate analogy because, by assumption,
the new technology will ultimately replace the old technology just as
nondiscriminators will ultimately replace discriminators. Judge Posner
properly questions whether the government would do a better job than
business enterprises at determining the optimal rate at which the new
technology should supplant the old. While I think the analogy is useful
to illustrate Judge Posner's point-that is, that with frictionless com-
petitive markets even the speed at which the economy moves towards a
new equilibrium will be optimal-there are important distinctions be-
tween a law that tries to encourage a new transportation technology
and one that tries to eradicate discrimination in employment.
For example, assume that all trans-Atlantic shipping is being car-
ried by boat when the invention of the cargo plane provides a lower
cost method of shipping. Ultimately, all trans-Atlantic shipments will
be by plane. This does not mean that we should immediately scrap the
existing boats, which may have no other use than for ocean freight
transportation. Since the boats have already been built, they represent
"sunk" costs.' 3 As a result, the variable cost of continuing to use the
boats may be less than the full cost of using a plane to carry the cargo.
In this case, the boats will be used until they wear out, and the propor-
tion of freight sent by air will constantly expand. A law that taxed the
use of the old boats would generate a quicker conversion to plane car-
goes but at the cost of wasting valuable resources.
Similarly, Judge Posner argues that the market, rather than the
government, should determine the rate at which discriminators are
eliminated, noting that adjustment costs are higher if the process occurs
too quickly.' 4 But we have already noted that the case of employment
discrimination is unlike the case of an old technology that should not
necessarily be immediately scrapped if it still retains sufficient value.
The reason is that a company that owns outmoded machines cannot
suddenly be transformed into an efficient operation by simply transfer-
x' Donohue, supra note 2, at 1426-27.
12 Posner, supra note 1, at 519.
13 This is not a pun, but an economic concept.
14 Posner, supra note 1, at 518.
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ring the assets to another party. But this is precisely the case for a
discriminatory firm: if a nondiscriminator buys out a discriminator, the
psychic costs of discrimination immediately disappear. Therefore, an
upper bound estimate of the cost needed to eliminate employer discrim-
ination is simply the cost of transferring the assets to nondis-
criminators.15 But the Becker model tells us that this transfer will take
place ultimately even without Title VII. 6 Indeed, the assurance that
the discriminators will be eradicated absent legislation is one of the
strongest arguments against Title VII, so the costs of adjustment associ-
ated with driving discriminators out of the market will presumably be
faced whether the Act is passed or not. Consequently, the only addi-
tional burden imposed by the Act results from the fact that these ad-
justment costs are borne earlier-and are thus larger in present value
terms-under Title VII.
To summarize: merely transferring ownership to a nondis-
criminator automatically yields an immediate benefit since the psychic
costs of discrimination would thereby be eliminated. 7 Moreover, while
there are no sunk costs to consider in the case of discrimination, there
are transaction costs incurred in transferring ownership. But, Judge
Posner can be heard to say, if there are immediate benefits to be had at
little cost, one would expect the market to generate these benefits.
Clearly, if every employer were ruthlessly maximizing profits, then we
would not need Title VII because there would be no animus-based dis-
crimination in the first place. If there are enough enterprising individu-
als who either exploit the possibility of hiring cheap black labor or who
simply buy out discriminatory firms, then there still may be no role for
the government, for in this event the path to the new equilibrium will
indeed be optimal. In essence, at every point in time these actors would
be calculating whether the benefits from undermining a discriminator
are sufficient to justify the costs of such competition. If the costs are too
great, it would not be efficient for government to encourage this behav-
15 It is costly to transfer resources from discriminators to nondiscriminators be-
cause lawyers, bankers, and company officials must be drawn from some other activity
to effect such a change. This is an upper bound estimate, since other responses to the
Act that would yield the same result of eliminating discrimination would presumably
be rejected if they were more costly, and might be accepted if they were less expensive.
10 See G. BECKER, supra note 4, at 39-47; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986).
1 We know that a nondiscriminator can earn a higher rate of return on his busi-
ness than a discriminator since the latter is burdened with the psychic costs of having to
associate with workers he dislikes. Therefore, if the discriminatory owner sells his busi-
ness to a nondiscriminator, then both parties can be made better off. The psychic costs
act as a type of "bribe" that encourages the sale. See J. Donohue, Diverting the
Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells 11-13 (Sept. 1987)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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ior. If the benefits exceed the costs at any given moment, the discrimi-
nators should be flushed from the system by the operation of market
forces.
But why doesn't the process occur more quickly? Perhaps the an-
swer lies in the fact that some types of departures from profit-max-
imization are punished far less quickly and thoroughly than we might
have thought."8 As long as there is some rigidity in the market, there is
no reason to believe that the market will generate the optimal path to
the nondiscriminatory equilibrium. 9 And, as Kenneth Arrow has
noted, the persistence of discrimination for decades suggests that either
Becker's model is wrong in predicting the demise of employer discrimi-
nation, or there is some rigidity in the market that may justify govern-
ment intervention.20 Consequently, it may be useful to undertake a sim-
ple cost-benefit analysis in order to get some sense of whether Title VII
might indeed be efficient and which factors influence this determina-
tion. The details of this analysis, which necessarily involves a number
of highly speculative assumptions, are set forth in the Appendix. Sec-
tion B summarizes the results.
B. The Results of A Simple Cost-Benefit Analysis
The major economic benefit, b, provided by Title VII is that it
more rapidly eliminates discriminators from the market, thereby elimi-
nating the large psychic costs of discrimination. At the same time, there
are three offsetting costs to be considered: 1) the short-run efficiency
loss associated with interfering with the preferences of discriminatory
employers, a; 2) the administration costs of the Act, c; and 3) the ad-
justment costs associated with driving discriminators from the market,
d.
The main conclusions reached with respect to these quantities are
as follows:
1. I assume that initially there are 50,000 discriminatory firms.
The passage of the Act precipitates the elimination of 5000 firms in the
is See R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 139-54 (1982); Akerlof & Yellen, Can Small Deviations From Rationality
Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 708
(1985).
'9 Donald Parsons has demonstrated that, in the wake of a shock to one sector
that causes a decline in product demand and a concomitant reduction in labor employed
in that sector, government intervention may provide a superior path to the new equilib-
rium if intersectoral wage adjustments are slow. Parsons, Unemployment, the Alloca-
tion of Labor, and Optimal Government Intervention, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 626, 627-
33 (1980).
2 See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1422 n.31.
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first year and 2500 firms in the second year that would have remained
in business for ten years in the laissez-faire state. At the same time,
there is an immediate increase in the wages of black labor by 5%, and
approximately 268,700 additional blacks are hired.21 The initial wave
eliminating 5000 firms generates annual benefits of $578 million for
the next ten years, at which time it is assumed that the firms would
have been driven out of the market by the normal competitive pressures
on discriminators. Assuming a 10% real interest rate, this stream of
benefits has a net present value of $3550 million.22 The second wave
generates benefits of half that size. Therefore, total benefits, b, have a
present value of $5165 million.
2. The dead weight efficiency loss, a, represents the psychic losses
imposed on discriminators by forcing them to hire more blacks than
they otherwise would. In the first year, this cost equals $208.9 million,
although as discriminators are driven from the market, the cost will
decline towards zero.2" Assuming that it falls to zero in twenty years,
the present value of this cost is $1200 million.
3. The annual administration costs, c, imposed by the Act are as-
sumed to be $300 million per year initially. The present value of this
cost is $1723 million if the initial $300 million cost declines to zero in
twenty years as discriminators are forced out of the market, and $3000
million if the costs continue forever.
4. The cost of adjustment, d, is the cost associated with discrimina-
tors being forced out of the market, whether by the Act or competition.
Although these expenses are assumed to be the same regardless of
which force drives out the discriminator, they are assumed to occur ten
years earlier under the Act. With 5000 firms driven out in the first
year and a per-firm adjustment cost of $200,000, d equals $1 billion.
Since these firms would ultimately have been driven out owing to nor-
mal competitive pressures, the only cost added by the Act is that this $1
billion is incurred immediately rather than in ten years. Thus, the pre-
sent value of this cost is $614 million. Adding in the costs associated
with the 2500 second-year exits leaves a total adjustment cost of $894
21 Although this analysis can easily be generalized to all forms of employment
discrimination, both Judge Posner and I have focused our discussion on racial
discrimination.
22 The official discount rate employed by the Office of Management and Budget
in evaluating governmental programs has been 10% since 1972. See Office of Manage-
ment & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Circular No. A-94 revised (March
27, 1972) (George P. Schultz, Director).
23 While the case that I am discussing involves 15% of the initial discriminators
being driven from the market by the Act in the first two years, I assume that normal
competitive forces will drive out the remaining 85% by the end of 20 years.
1987]
530 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
million.24
Consideration of the above four factors yields the following results.
Against the Act's benefits of $5165 million are arrayed the adjustment
costs of $894 million and the total future efficiency losses of $1200 mil-
lion and the total future administration costs of $1723 million. This
yields a net benefit of $1349 million as indicated in row 1 of Table 1.
Table 1
NET BENEFITS OF TITLE VII UNDER VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS
(in Millions)
Number of Discriminators Driven Out By The Act
NONE 25  10%26 1ST YR-10%
27  ALL 28
2ND YR-5%
Administration Costs
Fall to Zero in Year 20 -2923 14 1349 5737
Adding Net Effect
of Statistical
Discrimination -3009 -72 1263 5651
With No Human Capital
Effect From Statistical
Discrimination -3157 -220 1115 5503
Administration Costs
Continue Forever -4200 -1263 72 4460
Adding Net Effect
of Statistical
Discrimination -4286 -1349 -14 4374
With No Human Capital
Effect From Statistical
Discrimination -4434 -1497 -162 4226
24 Note that if additional firms were driven out by the Act in the third year and
beyond, then the estimated net benefits of the Act would have increased, since the bene-
fits for each succeeding year would exceed the accompanying adjustment costs.
25 All discriminators will be driven from the market in 20 years with or without
Title VII.
2' Ten percent of discriminators driven out in first year that would on average
have remained in business for 10 years without the Act. Thereafter, no more discrimi-
nators are driven out by the Act, although the market drives out the remaining discrim-
inators in 20 years.
27 Same as in column two, see supra note 26, with an additional 5% driven out by
the Act in the second year.
2 Five percent of the initial discriminators are driven out each year under Title
VII, while without the Act, the corresponding yearly figure is 2.5%. Thus, Title VII
eliminates all discriminators in 20 years, while the same result would take 40 years
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Table 1 demonstrates the effect of different assumptions concerning the
number of firms driven from the market. The scenario discussed above
involved the assumption that 10% of the discriminators were driven
from the market in the year following passage of Title VII and another
5% followed in the second year. If no additional firms were driven out
in the second year, the net benefit of the Act would fall to $14 million.
On the other hand, if all discriminators were driven out in 20 years,
while without Title VII this result would take 40 years, the benefits of
the Act would rise to $5737 million. Of course, if no discriminators are
driven out, there are no benefits in the model, and therefore the Act is
necessarily inefficient.
Table I also illustrates that assumptions about the continuation of
administration costs are important to an assessment of the efficiency of
the Act. Presumably, as discriminators are driven from the market, the
number of suits will decline. On the other hand, some of the adminis-
tration costs involve the costs associated with frivolous suits or engaging
in cosmetic changes to avoid litigation. Such costs might continue for-
ever. I therefore bracket the options by assuming in the first row that
the $300 million yearly administration costs decline to zero in twenty
years, and in the fourth row that they continue at this level forever.
This change causes the net benefits of the Act to fall from $1349 mil-
lion to $72 million, when the Act succeeds in driving out discriminators
in the first two years. If, however, no additional discriminators are
eliminated by the Act in the second or succeeding years, and if the
administration costs continue forever, then the net benefits of the Act
fall from $14 million to -$1263 million. This figure represents a one-
time expense of roughly $5 for every American.2"
C. Is It Inefficient to Prohibit Statistical Discrimination?
In my original Essay and thus far in the present Essay, I have
followed Becker in explicitly assuming that discrimination is caused by
employers' animus against the disfavored minority." Many analysts
have found this model appealing and have emphasized its prediction
that the free market will eliminate discriminatory employers."1 In his
without the Act.
2' To put this expense in perspective, $1263 million was roughly twice the size of
the loss that RCA incurred in three years on its ill-fated VideoDisc venture. See M.
GRAHAM, RCA AND THE VIDEODISC: THE BUSINESS OF RESEARCH 213 (1986) (total
loss to RCA was about $580 million).
" See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1415-20.
31 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-115 (1962) (market forces
are more effective than government programs in eliminating discrimination); R. Pos-
NER, supra note 16, § 27.1 (discrimination more likely in regulated than in unregu-
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rebuttal to my Essay, however, Judge Posner raises the possibility that
employment discrimination could have a different genesis, in which the
disciplinary role of the market as the ally of the victims of discrimina-
tion is absent. He notes that "a reluctance by employers to employ
blacks at the same wage as whites" may be the product of "statistical
discrimination," in which discrimination against, for example, blacks is
not the result of racial animus, but rather stems from a realization that,
for whatever reasons, black workers are on average less productive than
white workers. 2 If this generalization is accurate, and if it is costly to
ascertain individual abilities, then statistical discrimination, unlike
Beckerian discrimination, may be profit-maximizing.
Since statistical discrimination can be profit-maximizing, it tends
to be stable while Beckerian discrimination tends to be eroded by com-
petitive markets. Consequently, if we are dealing with a case of statisti-
cal rather than Beckerian discrimination, then the effect of Title VII is
indeed different from that presented in my initial Essay. Nonetheless,
the conclusion that I reached with respect to animus-based discrimina-
tion may also apply in the case of statistical discrimination: specifically,
while prohibiting employers from discriminating may be inefficient in
the short run, it may be efficient in the long run.
While at least one noted authority has questioned whether statisti-
cal discrimination is a convincing explanation for the large black-white
earnings differentials,"3 the model assumes that employers discriminate
against blacks because knowledge of race conveys useful information.
Even though employers realize that such generalizations are not univer-
sally true, it may still be profitable for firms to act as if they were
rather than to expend resources to determine which blacks have higher
than average productivity or which whites have lower than average
productivity. At first glance, it might seem that statistical discrimination
will necessarily be efficient whenever it is profit-maximizing. Nonethe-
less, it is possible that discrimination could be profit-maximizing for the
firm, yet inefficient for society as a whole.
The basic argument is that statistical discrimination will distort
the incentives for individuals to invest in human capital since they will
simply be treated as the average member of their class whether or not
they make such investments. By divorcing an employee's individual
lated markets); T. SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 34-51 (1981) (interferences
with a competitive market can cause distortions in the market's tendency to reward
nondiscriminatory employers).
32 Posner, supra note 1, at 520.
33 Cain, The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMicS 729 (1986).
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productivity from the wage that the employee receives, statistical dis-
crimination introduces inefficiencies into the human capital investment
decisions of workers. If the concomitant costs are large, statistical dis-
crimination may be harmful from a social perspective, although benefi-
cial to individual employers."' By discouraging workers from investing
in their own human capital, society is deprived of all of the benefits
that flow from these investments.35 Therefore, while we should recog-
nize that, unlike animus-based discrimination, statistical discrimination
is presumably profit-maximizing, a full cost-benefit analysis of Title
VII would include the benefits from proscribing statistical discrimina-
tion as well as the costs.3" Indeed, in estimating the added costs from
prohibiting statistical discrimination in Section B of the Appendix, it
seems a distinct possibility that the prohibition enlarges the previously
estimated net benefits of the Act. Moreover, even if statistical discrimi-
nation did not distort the incentive of workers,3 7 the costs imposed by
prohibiting it-$234 million-are smaller than the estimated net bene-
fits of the Act of $1349 million.38
My simple cost-benefit analysis is based on the assumption that
Title VII succeeded in increasing the wages and employment level of
black workers. I think this certainly would have been a reasonable as-
sumption for the authors of the Act back in 1964. From the perspective
of 1987, though, Judge Posner contends that the benefits that might
" See Lundberg & Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in
Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 340, 346-47 (1986); Schwab, Is Sta-
tistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 228, 233 (1983).
" Indeed, the Heckman piece cited by Judge Posner stresses the importance of
human capital investments in improving the economic status of blacks. As Heckman
notes, "The evidence on the importance of training and education on determining black
economic status is more favorable than many would have it." J. Heckman, The Impact
of Government on the Economic Status of Black Americans 22 (rev. May 1987) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
" I think Judge Posner would concede that if statistical discrimination could be
prevented, the income of blacks would be enhanced. This might also generate efficien-
cies, since anything that enhances the wealth of the poor can yield efficiency gains by
providing for more efficient means of social control. Donohue & Ayres, Posner's Sym-
phony No. 3: Thinking About the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1987).
"I Even if when viewed in isolation the costs from prohibiting statistical discrimi-
nation appeared to exceed the benefits, there may still be a basis for prohibiting it on
efficiency grounds. This might be the case if allowing statistical discrimination defenses
by employers substantially increased the Type 2 error in Title VII cases alleging ani-
mus-based discrimination. See generally R. HOGG & E. TANIS, PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICAL INFERENCES 254 (1977) (discussing and distinguishing Type 1 and Type
2 errors).
11 On the other hand, if the Act only provides benefits in the first year by knock-
ing out 10% of discriminators, then the benefits of Title VII become negative when the
effect of prohibiting statistical discrimination is included.
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have been predicted to flow from Title VII simply have not emerged. 9
It is to this issue that I now turn.
II. HAS TITLE VII IMPROVED THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF
BLACKS?
Judge Posner suggests that, regardless of what economic theory
might predict about the consequences of efforts to stimulate demand for
black labor by eliminating labor market discrimination, the empirical
evidence concerning the impact of Title VII is inconclusive.4° Whether
this is because the Act's benefits, if any, have been modest or because,
as Judge Posner himself notes, it is exceptionally difficult to untangle
the effects of Title VII on black economic progress when so many other
factors are occurring simultaneously, is of course a crucial question.
Where one places the burden of persuasion may well resolve the con-
troversy given the empirical uncertainties.
It is worth noting that my rough cost-benefit analysis suggesting
that Title VII was efficient was based on the assumption that the pas-
sage of the Act would elevate black wages by 5%. Given the tremen-
dous demographic changes that the economy was undergoing in the late
60s and the 70s, it is perhaps not surprising that an increase of this
relatively modest proportion would not emerge clearly from aggregate
United States data. For example, at the same time that Title VII might
have been providing a demand stimulus for blacks, the increased labor
force participation of women may have been dampening black wage
increases through a large supply effect. The very interesting and recent
empirical evidence presented by Judge Posner to dispute the claimed
benefits of Title VII must be evaluated in this light.
Perhaps a brief discussion of some of the literature dealing with
the effect of Title VII would be useful. A number of analysts have
noted that the economic position of blacks appeared to improve after
1964. In 1973, Richard Freeman characterized these gains as "dra-
matic," signalling a "virtual collapse in traditional discriminatory pat-
terns." '41 Richard Butler and James Heckman questioned this conclu-
sion a few years later. Their basic thesis was that, after 1964, the least
productive blacks tended to leave the labor market, thereby creating the
illusion in the comparative black/white income data that blacks had
" See Posner, supra note 1, at 524.
40 See id. at 524.
41 Freeman, The Changing Labor Market for Black Americans 1948-72, in 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 67, 67 (1973).
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experienced economic progress. 41
When Freeman revisited the issue in 1981, he had clearly become
more guarded in his conclusions about the extent of black progress.
Nonetheless, he concluded that the supply-side effect that Butler and
Heckman had identified was not a significant factor in explaining the
statistical appearance of black progress. In fact, Freeman contended
that Butler and Heckman had "inadvertently used data with several
keypunch errors," which, when corrected, undermined their supply-
side explanation.43 After a very careful analysis of the data, Freeman
concluded as follows:
In sum, while by no means definitive, or ruling out other
factors, the evidence on timing, on incidence, and on com-
pany personnel and employment practices suggests that at
least some of the post-1964 black gains resulted from in-
creases in demand for black labor induced, at least in part,
by programs designed to accomplish that purpose. Imperfect
though it is, the evidence indicates that the national antibias
effort has contributed to black economic progress. As far as
can be told from the data, if Title VII were repealed and
equal employment efforts ended, the rate of black advance-
ment would fall.
44
I am grateful to Judge Posner for bringing to my attention
Heckman's latest work in this area.'" This brief article conveys the
very important message that it is unwise to rely uncritically on much of
the data introduced into popular discussions of public policy issues. For
example, Heckman persuades me that a considerable amount of the
ostensible progress in narrowing black/white wage differentials is the
result of a disproportionate tendency on the part of low-earning blacks
to drop out of the labor force and of problems in the official earnings
statistics that understate the earnings of (predominantly white) mem-
bers of high-income occupations and disproportionately fail to interview
poor blacks.' 8
While Heckman states, however, that "very little reliable informa-
tion is available about negative or positive effects of affirmative action
42 See Butler & Heckman, Government's Impact on the Labor Market Status of
Black Americans: A Critical Review, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIA-
TION, EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235, 235, 265-67 (1977).
"I Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?,
in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247, 291 n.26 (1981).
44 Id. at 283.
41 J. Heckman, supra note 35.
48 See id. at 11-13.
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programs and equal rights programs on the status of blacks in the ag-
gregate,""7 he is more forceful in drawing conclusions based on his own
research conducted with Brook Payner on the South Carolina labor
market."8 Heckman notes that the share of black employment in the
South Carolina textile industry was less than 10% before 1965-the
year that Title VII became operative-but by 1970, the industry was
roughly 30% black.49 Heckman and Payner found that
the breakthrough in black employment in the state occurred
shortly after the implementation of Title VII civil rights leg-
islation. The highly synchronized breakthrough in black em-
ployment that occurred in all counties of the state irrespec-
tive of the tightness or slackness of county local labor
markets and the available supply of blacks suggests a com-
mon factor was present in all counties-federal pressure. 50
Moreover, Heckman's conclusion on the South Carolina experience is
consistent with the basic message of my own Essay. He writes that "the
black breakthrough occurred at a time when the South Carolina and
national economies were generally tight and that federal civil rights ac-
tivity may have primarily played a facilitating role for a breakthrough
that underlying economic forces might have produced in any event."' 
This is precisely the point that my Essay tried to emphasize: Title VII
can speed up the arrival at the ultimate nondiscriminatory equilibrium.
I am reluctant to dismiss the effectiveness of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion in light of the experience in South Carolina suggesting that the
effects of Title VII were much as theory would predict.
Judge Posner offers two reasons why Title VII may not be effec-
tive in practice. First, he argues that, because of the nature of proof in
Title VII cases, employers have responded to the Act as if it mandated
a higher minimum wage for blacks than the market would establish.52
As a result, there are winners and losers in the process, and, on the
whole, the gains and losses cancel each other out. I conceded this possi-
bility in my original Essay.53 On the other hand, the purpose of Title
VII is to provide greater protection for black workers than a mere
equal pay act, and if in practice Title VII has not been implemented in
this way, perhaps a greater commitment towards, rather than a willing-
47 Id. at 22.
48 See id.
49 Id. at 3-4.
50 Id. at 17.
51 Id.
6 See Posner, supra note 1, at 523 n.28.
5 See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1426 n.36.
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ness to dispense with, Title VII would be appropriate. 4 Furthermore,
even if discriminators avoid full compliance with Title VII by treating
it only as an equal pay act, they will still be worse off with such an act
than they would be under laissez faire. Therefore, in accordance with
the mechanism I described in my initial Essay, Title VII should still
hasten the elimination of these discriminators from the market, thereby
generating the attendant benefits.
Second, Judge Posner contends that Title VII may not increase
the demand for black labor since employers will realize that blacks may
end up suing them for employment discrimination. 5 On this view,
rather than stimulating demand for black labor, Title VII acts as a tax
on black labor that harms the economic prospects of blacks. While
Judge Posner is correct in identifying this cost, I suspect it is quite
small in comparison with the offsetting stimulus to the hiring of black
workers, since a failure to hire blacks will definitely increase the
probability of a Title VII lawsuit. Thus, one fight say that there is a
small tax associated with hiring blacks because they may someday sue
the employer if fired or not promoted, but a large tax associated with
failing to hire blacks because of the increased likelihood that they will
sue. The net effect would seem to be a demand stimulus.
Judge Posner might reply, however, that the employer may be
able to avoid both taxes by simply relocating in states with virtually no
minority populations. This possibility underscores the difficulty in try-
ing to restrain market preferences through legal regimes. Nonetheless,
my guess is that the incentive to avoid the small tax is too modest to
provide a substantial impetus for firms to move to locations with small
minority populations. I have estimated that the annual administration
costs associated with the Act are roughly $300 million. Perhaps half of
this cost falls on private employers, the rest falling on taxpayers and
plaintiffs. If we assume that each year 2000 plaintiffs receive backpay
awards of $10 thousand-which seems quite high-then the total of the
awards generated by these cases is $20 million.56 In addition, I assume
that 12,000 cases are settled, before a federal suit is filed, at an average
settlement of $1000 per case, or $12 million in total. Combining the
potential administration burden of $150 million with the potential trial
and settlement losses of $32 million yields a total potential liability of
54 I demonstrated in my original Essay how an equal pay act might decrease black
employment from the level of employment in a discriminatory laissez-faire state. See id.
Title VII was designed to increase both the black employment level and black wages by
mandating the attainment of the nondiscriminatory equilibrium.
15 See Posner, supra note 1, at 524.
56 I have estimated the annual number of suits alleging racial bias in employment
to be 6000.
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$182 million. Consequently, the expected "small tax" from hiring one
of the 10.7 million black workers is about $17 per year. I doubt that
amount is sufficient to cause many significant relocations. Moreover, if
this factor had an important influence on regional growth, one would
expect that, in the wake of Title VII, regions with high numbers of
blacks such as the South would have stagnated.57 But, rather than stag-
nating, the South has experienced an "economic revolution," which is
all the more dramatic given the fact that "as recently as twenty-five
years ago, regional economic backwardness in the states of the tradi-
tional American South was considered an intractable problem of con-
tinuing national concern."58
CONCLUSION
Limits of time and space prevent me from addressing a number of
issues germane to the debate over Title VII, but I should mention two
additional points in passing. First, in this Essay, I have tried to assess
the factors that influence the question of the efficiency of Title VII
while giving full weight to the preferences of all individuals. The re-
sulting cost-benefit analysis-although based upon a large number of
necessarily arbitrary assumptions-provides tentative support for the
conclusion that either Title VII is efficient, or at least not as costly as
Judge Posner may have feared. Some might contend, however, that in
analyzing Title VII, we should simply refuse to recognize the psychic
costs imposed on discriminators when they associate with black work-
ers. In that case, the nondiscriminatory outcome that Title VII seeks to
impose is by definition optimal, and the only remaining questions are
whether the Act can move us toward that outcome and at what cost.
This approach necessarily strengthens the case for Title VII.
Second, there is also a strong argument to be made that Title VII
has been part of a much larger governmental effort undertaken in the
United States since World War II to decrease racial prejudice. This
effort includes President Truman's actions in integrating the armed
forces in the 1940s, the Brown v. Board of Education59 decision re-
quiring the desegregation of schools in the 1950s, and the passage of
state equal employment opportunity laws prior to the enactment of Ti-
1 While in 1980 blacks made up 11.69% of the total U.S. population, they com-
prised 18.63% of the Southern population-a figure almost twice the size of the pro-
portion of blacks in any other primary census region. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1983 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 2.
88 Wright, The Economic Revolution in the American South, 1 EcoN. PERSP. 161
(1987).
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tle VII in 1964.0 In a complex interactive process, these governmental
acts were hastened by and encouraged the decline in discriminatory at-
titudes that has occurred since World War 11.6' Of course, any incre-
mental role played by Title VII in stimulating this attitudinal change
would yield additional benefits-similar to technological advances in
the transportation realm, to use Judge Posner's analogy-in reducing
the psychic costs of discrimination. 2
Finally, the primary assumptions upon which the conclusion of
Title VII's efficiency depends are that 1) increased demand causes the
wages of black workers to rise 5%; and 2) substantial numbers of dis-
criminators are driven from the market earlier than they would have
been without Title VII. If these conditions hold, then the Act generates
substantial benefits that in all likelihood far exceed its costs. Interest-
ingly, while Judge Posner has emphasized his doubts that Title VII
has been effective in aiding blacks, my cost-benefit analysis has shown
that relatively modest gains for blacks yield very large efficiency gains
if simultaneously the Act forces discriminators from the market. Since
5% is such a modest wage hike, I am fairly confident that this condition
has been met. Nonetheless, while I have tried to use Becker's model of
discrimination to suggest that the Act will in fact eliminate discrimina-
tors, I am much less certain whether this prediction of theory has been
borne out in reality. Of course, if the relatively more forceful economic
pressures exerted by Title VII have failed to discipline discriminators,
we may well have to rethink the view that market pressures under lais-
sez faire will succeed in doing so. 3
Accordingly, there is much that we still do not know about the
consequences of enacting Title VII. I hope my original Essay and the
60 Almost all the states in the Pacific, mid-Atlantic, and east north central regions
of the country had adopted equal employment acts prior to 1964. See P. BURSTEIN,
DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS 52 (1985).
61 Paul Burstein presents evidence on the continual increase in the numbers of
individuals who consider blacks to be equal to whites. See id. at 141.
62 The power of law to influence attitudes is captured succinctly in the comment
of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1863:
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they
committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain
from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they
regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged with the hearty appro-
bation of all reasonable men.
J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863)
quoted in J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 21 (1974).
6' An alternative position is that both Title VII and the market are capable of
forcing discriminators to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion, but are not able to drive
them from the market. While there may well be merit to this view, it is inconsistent
with the Beckerian and Posnerian notions that the psychic costs of discrimination are
exactly analogous to other economic costs such as transportation costs.
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dialogue it has spawned have helped clarify some of the relevant issues
so that future research can provide more precise answers to these
questions.
APPENDIX: A SIMPLE COST-BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII
Both my Essay and Judge Posner's response have emphasized that
there are a number of costs and benefits associated with the enactment
of Title VII. In this Appendix, I would like to try to provide some very
rough estimates concerning the size of these various costs and benefits
in order to ascertain whether any tentative conclusion can be drawn
concerning the efficiency of the Act, and also to shed light on the factors
that influence this determination. This endeavor necessarily requires
me to make a number of highly speculative assumptions and estimates,
which I will try to state explicitly so that others may question or vary
them as they see fit.
A. Animus-Based Discrimination
While Section B of this Appendix extends my analysis to include
the case of "statistical discrimination," I will initially continue my focus
on animus-based employer discrimination and assume that the Act af-
fects the decisions of discriminatory employers in the manner set forth
in my original Essay. Therefore, the major economic benefit, b, pro-
vided by Title VII is that it more rapidly eliminates discriminators
from the market, thereby eliminating the large psychic costs of discrim-
ination. At the same time, there are three offsetting costs to be consid-
ered: 1) the short-run efficiency loss associated with interfering with
the preferences of discriminatory employers, a; 2) the administration
costs of the Act, c; and 3) the adjustment costs associated with driving
discriminators from the market, d. Subsections (1) through (4) will of-
fer some speculative estimates for variables a through d, respectively.
Subsection (5) will then evaluate the efficiency of Title VII using these
estimates.
1. The Short-run Efficiency Loss Caused by the Act
My original Article demonstrated that Title VII would impose a
short-run efficiency cost on discriminators since they would be com-
pelled by law to ignore what for them are the real costs of associating
with blacks. I demonstrated that this cost was equal to area CE 2 E1 in
[Vol. 136:523
REPLY TO JUDGE POSNER
Figure 2.64
Figure 2




To estimate this area, we need two pieces of information: 1) the in-
crease in black employment that would result from eliminating discrim-
ination - Q1-Q2 - and 2) the size of the discriminatory "tax" -
E2-C - which in subsection (2), below, I estimate to be 10% of the
black wage, W2.
64 See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1429 n.41.
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First, if the 10% "tax" on black workers were eliminated, black
employment would expand: the cost of black labor would fall and the
wages received by blacks would rise by a combined total of 10%. It
seems reasonable to estimate the drop in the cost of labor to be half the
size of the 10% discriminatory "tax."65 This roughly 5% decline in la-
bor cost would stimulate demand for black labor by 2.5%, assuming an
elasticity of demand for black labor of 0.5.6 Thus, the increase in black
labor hired would be 2.5% of the 10.7 million black workers, 7 or ap-
proximately 268,700 workers.
Second, 10% of the mean black salary of $15,54668 equals $1555.
The area of triangle CE 2 E1 is then given by ( ) (268,700) ($1555) =
$208.9 million. This efficiency loss will be incurred each year until all
discriminators have been driven from the market, although it will de-
cline continuously as the number of discriminators falls.
" This assumption implies that, if the discrimination "tax" were eliminated, the
benefits from the fall in the total cost to employers-monetary and psychic-of hiring
black labor and from the increase in wages paid to black labor would be shared equally
by employers and black workers.
68 Most studies have concluded that the demand for low-wage labor is relatively
inelastic. See Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employ-
ment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 375, 487 (1982); Clark & Free-
man, How Elastic is the Demand for Labor, 20 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 509, 518
(1980) (estimating the elasticity of demand for labor at 0.4 or 0.5).
"7 Total U.S. civilian employment equalled 109.6 million in July of 1986. 1987
ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT, at 282. Of this number, 9.8% were black. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 385. This calculation provides a figure of 10.7 million black workers.
The number of black full-time workers in 1986 was 8,654,000. See BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 214 (Jan.
1987).
68 1 estimate the total earnings of the 10.7 million full-time and part-time black
employees to be roughly $167.1 billion. These figures are obtained as follows: Total
wages and salaries paid in 1986 were roughly $2.07 trillion. 1987 ECON. REP. OF THE
PRESIDENT, at 270. Of the total male work force 8.8% is black and 11.1% of the total
female work force is black. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
supra note 67, at 378. Furthermore, black workers on average earn roughly 70% of
nonblack male workers. Cain, supra note 33, at 701 ("the ratios of black-to-white and
Hispanic-to-white incomes tend to be around 0.6 or 0.7"); Smith & Welch, Race and
Poverty: A Forty-Year Record, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 152 (1987) (Papers and Proceed-
ings) (estimating the black-white wage ratio for men at 0.73 in 1980). I calculate mean
black wage as follows: Extrapolating from the 1985 figures, I estimate that there are
about 55.5 million nonblack male workers, about 10.7 million black workers, and 43.3
million nonblack female workers, each of whom earns approximately 70% of the wage
of a nonblack male worker. If W is the annual wage of a nonblack male worker, then
55.5(W)+(10.7+43.3) (0.7) (W) = $2,070,000. W = $22,209, and the average black
wage = $15,546. Therefore, in 1986 blacks received approximately 8.1% of the total
wage bill, or $167.1 billion.
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2. The Benefits Generated by the Act
In order to provide some estimate of the benefits associated with
the eradication of discrimination, it may be helpful to begin by examin-
ing the extreme case in which Title VII succeeded in immediately eras-
ing all discrimination against blacks. In this case, the gain from the Act
would simply be the social cost previously imposed by discrimination in
employment. In my paper, I analogized this cost to the cost of a tax on
black labor in which the revenues were simply discarded. Where the
tax revenues are wasted, the cost of the tax would be the revenues
themselves plus any associated dead weight efficiency loss. Similarly, as
I showed in Figure 2 of my paper, the social cost of employment dis-
crimination against blacks includes the discriminatory "tax" imposed
on black labor plus the associated dead weight efficiency loss, which is
equal in size to the $208.9 million cost estimated in subsection (1)."9
Therefore, we need only estimate the discriminatory "tax," depicted as
W2 BE 2 C in Figure 2.70 This requires an estimate of the size of the
"tax" - B-W 2 - measured as a percentage of the discriminatory
wage, W2. In Subsection (1), I assumed that the percentage "tax" is
twice the size of the percentage increase in the black wage-from W2
to Wl-that would occur if discrimination against blacks were elimi-
nated.71 Therefore, we must speculate on how much black wages would
rise in the absence of racial discrimination in employment. If this per-
centage increase were 5%, then the discrimination "tax" would be
about $5.6 billion; if the increase were 10%, then "tax" would rise to
$11.1 billion.7 2 To be conservative, I will employ the smaller figure.
69 The total loss caused by the racial discrimination is given by area W2BE 2E1C.
See Donohue, supra note 2, at 1429 nn.41-42. Area W BE C represents tie psychic
cost to employers of hiring those blacks they would have irei absent Title VII, which
is analogous to the wasted tax revenue. Area CE 2 E1 represents the dead weight loss
stemming from the reduced hiring of blacks, which I estimated to be $208.9 million.
70 There is one additional complication: Figure 2 is drawn to reflect a situation in
which all employers are initially racial discriminators. Therefore, the amount of the
"tax" per black worker multiplied by the number of black workers yields the area of
rectangle W2 BE 2 C. In Subsection (3), however, I posit that only half of the employers
are discriminators. Therefore, the discriminatory "tax" will only be levied by half of
the employers. Because the market will then tend to shift black employment away from
the discriminators, I will assume that only one-third of black workers will be employed
by discriminators. In this event, the elimination of the discriminatory "tax" will only
generate one-third of the benefit suggested by the area W2 BE9 C.
71 If the demand for black labor were perfectly elastic, then these two percentages
would be identical. The more inelastic is the demand for black labor, ceteris paribus,
the greater the difference in these percentages. I assumed in subsection (1) that the
demand for black labor is 0.5.
71 If one were estimating the entire area W2BE 2C, then for an X% increase in
black wages from eliminating discrimination, the estimated discrimination "tax" would
be 2X% of $167.1 billion. Since we must multiply this number by one-third to reflect
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Adding the efficiency loss of $208.9 million to the discriminatory
"tax" of $5.6 billion yields a total cost of discrimination of $5.8 bil-
lion. 3 Because Title VII did not immediately drive out all discrimina-
tors, the expected yearly benefit from the Act is less than the full $5.8
billion estimate 4.7 A critical assumption, then, concerns the relative effi-
ciency of the Act versus the free market in eliminating discriminators.
My base case assumes that all firms would be driven from the market
in 20 years with or without the Act, but that in the first two years after
passage Title VII causes a boost in eliminating some discriminators
that would have otherwise remained in business for an average of 10
years. If in the first year the passage of the Act succeeded in driving out
X% of the initial pool of discriminators and only Y% would have been
driven out without the legislation, then the benefit from the Act would
have been (X-Y)% of $5.8 billion. Here I will assume that (X-Y) =
10. This implies that for each year until these discriminators would
otherwise have been driven from the market-which I estimate to be
ten years-the Act generates benefits of $578 million. Moreover, in
successive years if X-Y>0, then a new cohort of discriminating firms
will be driven from the market by the Act, adding an additional round
of yearly benefits. For my base case, I assume that X-Y=5 in the
second year. As Table 1 shows, I examine three other cases: 1) when
the Act does not increase the number of firms driven out; 2) when the
Act only drives out additional firms in the first year; and, 3) when X
= 5% for 20 years and Y = 2.5% for 40 years.
only those black workers employed by discriminatory employers, the "tax" associated at
X = 5% is given by (1/3) (.10) ($167.1 billion), or $5.6 billion; at X = 10%, the tax is
given by (13) (.20) ($167.1 billion), or $11.1 billion.
" The relative sizes of the efficiency loss and the discriminatory "tax" reflects a
general truth in welfare economics: social cost rectangles are far larger than dead
weight triangles. Perhaps the first dramatic illustration of this fact came in evaluating
the social cost of monopoly. Harberger had estimated the dead weight loss from monop-
oly at a very small amount because he only focussed on the dead weight triangle analo-
gous to my area CE E1. See Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM.
ECON. REv. 77, 86 1954). It was Judge Posner who then showed that, if monopolists
competed for monopoly profits, they would transfer some or all of these profits into
social costs-analogous to my discriminatory "tax." As a result, the estimate of the cost
of monopoly was substantially elevated. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 815-16 (1975).
71 In Figure 3 of my original Essay, I showed that the time paths of social welfare
would be different with and without Title VII. If the early losses imposed by the Act
were offset by the later gains-or in the terminology of that Figure, if b>a-then the
Act would be efficient. While my $5.8 billion estimate of the total cost of discrimination
was attempting to approximate SW1 -SW 2, one can see from Figure 3 that this differ-
ence is greater than the benefit from Title VII in any single year, as long as some of
the discriminators are being driven out via pure market forces.
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3. The Administration Costs of Title VII
Our analysis requires an estimate of the administration costs gen-
erated by Title VII's proscription against discrimination on the basis of
race. If we start with Judge Posner's figure of 9000 cases as a rough
estimate of the annual number of employment discrimination cases filed
in federal court, it might be reasonable to assume that possibly 6000 of
these cases are Title VII cases brought by blacks. 5 If each Title VII
case filed in federal court consumed $12.67 thousand7 ' in resources,
then the social cost of litigated cases would equal about $76 million.
Perhaps twice as many cases are pursued and settled out of court at a
cost in terms of investigation and negotiation expense71 of $2 thousand
per case, thereby adding an additional $24 million. Therefore, the esti-
mated costs of litigated and nonlitigated cases are $100 million. To this
we must add any costs incurred by employers in undertaking cosmetic
efforts that avoid litigation, without furthering the goal of reduced dis-
crimination.7 8 I add another $100 million for this factor. After adding
the budget of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"),79 administration costs rise to roughly $300 million. As with
7' Judge Posner's figure of 9000 represents all cases that are filed in the federal
courts and coded as employment discrimination cases by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts. I am currently investigating this information to determine what per-
centage of these cases are Title VII cases brought by blacks. At this point I do not have
the results from this study, so I chose the two-thirds figure as a rough approximation.
This would imply that only one-third of all cases are brought by nonblacks alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, handicap, and age. In making this and
succeeding estimates, I have tried to be conservative, relative to the argument that I
espouse.
7" The $12.67 thousand figure represents an estimate of the resources consumed
by the plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial system in dealing with all filed Title VII
cases. My own analysis of a data tape provided by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts has indicated that 83% of all employment discrimination cases
brought in the federal courts terminate before trial. Accordingly, the legal and judicial
resources expended on such cases are relatively small. Using data on federal employ-
ment discrimination cases extracted from the Civil Litigation Research Project for me
by Herbert Kritzer, whose generous assistance I gratefully acknowledge, I estimate the
mean legal fees for plaintiffs to be $1244 and for defendants to be $9378, expressed in
1986 dollars. To this combined total of $10,623, I add roughly $2000 in judicial costs,
which yields the $12.67 thousand figure. See generally Trubek, Sarat; Felstiner,
Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983)
(reporting and analyzing results of a national empirical study of the costs of litigation
in the United States).
71 I identify the investigation and negotiation expense to be the major transaction
cost. This figure does not include the sum that is redistributed from the employer to the
employee since simple wealth redistribution imposes no social cost.
78 Note that the cosmetic efforts could be taken either by nondiscriminators hoping
to avoid baseless litigation or by discriminators seeking to continue their unlawful
conduct.
71 The fiscal year 1983 budget for the EEOC was $146 million. 18 EEOC ANN.
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the cost of overriding the preferences of discriminatory employers, a,
this cost should decline each year as the number of discriminators falls.
In all cases, I assume that discriminators are eliminated from the mar-
ket in 20 years under Title VII. Therefore, I consider two cases: 1)
where administration costs fall to zero when all discrimination has been
eliminated, and 2) where administration costs remain constant at $300
million annually forever.
4. The Increased Adjustment Costs Imposed by Title VII
In the text, I argued that the only additional adjustment burden
imposed by the Act in rapidly eliminating discriminators is caused by
the fact that these adjustment costs are borne earlier-and are thus
larger in present value terms-under Title VII. If the adjustment cost,
d, occurs immediately under Title VII, but would occur T years later
in the laissez-faire case, then the incremental cost imposed by Title VII
is given by: (2) d- [d/(l+r)T],
where r is the real interest rate. In order to estimate this quantity, we
therefore need to estimate d, r, and T. I find d to be difficult to ap-
proximate. My approach is as follows: I need to estimate: 1) the num-
ber of firms that are prematurely driven from the market, vis-a-vis the
laissez-faire case; and 2) the average adjustment cost for each episode. I
previously assumed that, in the first year under Title VII, an additional
10% of the discriminatory firms would be forced to exit. If we assume
that half the roughly 100,000 major private employers"0 are discrimina-
tors, then 5000 firms are assumed to be driven out by the Act."1 As-
suming that each case expends $200 thousand in resources, then the
cost would be $1 billion.
I also choose r to be 10% and assume that the firms driven out in
the first year would have been driven out ten years later without Title
VII.82 Thus, T = 10. Substituting these values into Equation (2)
REP. 53, 53 (1984). If we adhere to our assumption that two-thirds of the employment
discrimination cases apply to blacks, then this element increases the administration costs
by about $100 million.
" I define a private firm to be a "major employer" if it has at least 100 employ-
ees. In 1984, there were 109,021 firms in this category. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 3 (1984).
8' In fact, in the last 15 years, there have only been about 90,000 employment
discrimination actions brought in the federal court-many of them filed against govern-
ment agencies-so, clearly, many major employers have never been sued for violating
Title VII. Moreover, if we adhere to the previous assumption that two-thirds of these
cases allege racial discrimination against blacks, then only 60,000 suits have been filed,
many of which could be filed against repeat offenders and governmental entities.
82 The greater the amount of time that Title VII speeds up the demise of the
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yields:
(3) 1 billion- [1 billion/(l+.l) 10] = $614 million.
Note that this cost is incurred once for each cohort of discriminatory
firms driven from the market earlier than they would have been had
the Act not been passed. Thus, in my base case, where 5% of the dis-
criminators are driven out in the second year, there will be an addi-
tional cost of $307 million.83 Therefore, one would expect the number
to decline to zero as the number of discriminators remaining falls to
zero.
5. The Final Verdict
Figure A depicts the four costs and benefits that we have just
Figure A:
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TITLE VII
Year
discriminators, the faster expense d is incurred, and thus the more costly the Act be-
comes. On the other hand, faster elimination of discriminators increases the benefits
from the Act. Similarly, a higher real interest rate elevates the additional adjustment
burden of Title VII, but it diminishes the stream of other future costs and benefits. The
relative magnitudes of costs and benefits were not changed greatly when I used a 5%
discount rate.
8 Table 1 also presents the case in which the Act drives out all discriminators in
20 years. In this case, the Act eliminates an additional 2.5% of the discriminators for
each of the first 20 years, imposing an adjustment cost of $144 million per year, or a
net present value of $1230.
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estimated for the base case. The figure reveals that by driving out 5000
discriminators in the first year that would have otherwise remained in
operation for ten years, the Act would generate yearly benefits of $578
million for years one to ten, and by driving out 2500 more in the sec-
ond year adds additional benefits, b, of $289 million from years two to
eleven.84 At the same time, the demise of these firms imposes a one-shot
$614 million adjustment cost in year one and a $307 million cost in
year two-d. Moreover, the Act imposes two other costs: the dead
weight efficiency loss-a-that starts at $208.9 million per year and
declines to zero in year twenty, and the administration
costs-c-starting at $300 million and declining to zero in year
twenty.85
In order to assess the efficiency of Title VII under our base set of
assumptions, I then discounted the future costs and benefits using a
10% rate. Reducing these areas to net present values, we find that the
benefits of the Act equal $5165 million, and the costs a, c, and d are
$1200 million, $1723 million, and $894 million-or a total cost of
$3816 million. Based on these estimates of the costs and benefits of the
Act, I find that Title VII yields a net gain of $1349 million if the
Becker model is correct and employers comply with the Act.
Alternatively, if one assumes that the administration costs of the
Act continue forever, even after discriminators have been driven from
the market, then the net benefits of the Act fall to $72 million.86 Cer-
tainly, if it is fair to assume that a significant number of discriminators
will be driven from the market by the Act, the overall impression con-
veyed by Table 1 is that Title VII generates modest positive efficiency
gains. Accordingly, it looks as if Title VII is efficient under the argu-
ments made in my original Essay.
B. Statistical Discrimination
If all potential employees were white, then race would not provide
84 Thus, the gains from eliminating discriminators are shown to be $578 million
in the first year, $867 million in years two to ten, and $289 million in year eleven.
85 Expressed algebraically, the condition for the efficiency of Title VII would be:
2; { (bt-at-ct) _[1_ (Ir)]dt I >0t (l -tr)t  (1 -+-r)T
where T = the number of years from the time d is incurred under Title VII until
when it would have been incurred had the Act not passed.
" The assumption that the administration costs continue at $300 million per year
forever increases this estimated cost from the $1723 million figure given in the text to
$3000 million, thereby raising the total estimated cost from $3816 million to $5093
million.
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any useful information to employers. Therefore, if we wish to assess
the benefits that it does provide, we need only examine the potential
black work force of 10.7 million workers. Now, presumably, race pro-
vides potentially useful information to an employer only at the time of
hiring a worker; once the worker has been employed for a while, the
employer would be able to form more precise judgments than those
based on a crude racial indicator. Therefore, race should provide infor-
mation only to an employer hiring a new worker. While I am not per-
suaded that there are substantial differences between blacks and whites
after one has taken into account easily measured traits such as educa-
tion and academic performance, for this analysis I will accept Judge
Posner's argument that such is the case.
If 3 million blacks apply for 3 jobs each every year, then there will
be 9 million instances in which race might be a factor providing infor-
mation to an employer. But while on average race might provide useful
information, it is clearly not a precise measure. With some investment
of time, one would expect that the useful information conveyed by race
could be obtained in some other fashion. If it could be purchased at the
cost of $10 per instance, then the added cost to the employer from test-
ing would be $90 million per year. On the other hand, because race is a
crude measure, its use will generate errors. For example, high produc-
tivity blacks will be rejected in favor of average productivity white
workers. If such blacks happened to be only 1% more productive than
the lower productivity whites who were hired in their place, then the
loss to employers would be roughly $222 per year."7 Even if only the
top 10% of black workers-300,000 applicants-were superior to aver-
age white workers, then the employer would sacrifice $66.6 million in
lost productivity by using race as an informational device to evaluate
these black workers. Therefore, the net benefit to employers of statisti-
cal discrimination might be assessed at $23.4 million per year.88 Using
other plausible values for the costs associated with statistical discrimi-
nation might well suggest that this practice is not profitable for
employers.89
Moreover, banning statistical discrimination encourages blacks to
invest in their own human capital, since they will be more fully re-
"' The mean earnings of nonblack male workers in 1986 were $22,209. See supra
note 68. One percent of this figure would be $222.
" The $90 million savings in information costs is offset against the $66.6 million
loss in productivity.
89 Presumably, if statistical discrimination were not even profitable for employers,
few employers would engage in this practice. In that event, the ability of statistical
discrimination to explain the perceived black-white earnings would be seriously in
doubt.
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warded for their individual strengths and held more accountable for
their individual shortcomings. In addition, the passage of Title VII it-
self will encourage blacks to invest more in their human capital more
generally, causing a convergence in skills between blacks and whites. It
is hard to put an estimate on these considerations, but if the three mil-
lion job searchers mentioned above were induced by the banning of dis-
crimination to invest $100-in time or money-in greater education or
training, one might expect at least a 13% return on this investment.9"
The benefit of such a return for a 40-year period, discounted at 10%,
would be $127.13. In this event, the cost imposed by statistical discrim-
ination each year is $27.13 per worker times 3 million workers, or
$81.4 million. On the other hand, if in succeeding years the investments
were only undertaken by the new entrants to the black labor
force-perhaps about 300,000 workers per year-the future stream of
benefits would fall to roughly $8.14 million. Depending on one's pre-
cise estimates of this pattern, statistical discrimination evaluated on its
own may be either efficient or inefficient.9 '
In Table 1, 1 adjust the previous estimates of Title VII under two
different assumptions concerning the effect of banning statistical dis-
crimination. First, I assume that statistical discrimination yielded bene-
fits to employers of $23.4 million per year from decreased informa-
tional costs, but that it imposed burdens on workers by distorting their
human capital investment decisions. I assume that the total benefit from
banning statistical discrimination in terms of added investment in
human capital would equal $81.4 million in the first year and $8.14
million per year thereafter. These adjustments reduce the net benefits
of the Act in present value terms by about $86 million. Second, I also
present figures based on the assumption that banning statistical dis-
crimination has no effect on the investment decisions of workers. In this
0 Estimates of the monetary returns to human capital investment range from 8%
to around 30%, with the latter figure representing the higher, nonlinear returns to
investments in college education. Since there are also nonpecuniary benefits associated
with "better" jobs, my estimate of a return on human capital investment that is only 3
percentage points above the discount rate seems conservative. See Willis, Wage Determi-
nants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human Capital Earnings, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF LABOR ECONOMicS 525, 536 (1986) (estimated rates of return on schooling are
"higher than the real interest rate"). I benefited from discussions with Joseph Altonji
on this general subject.
9 If it were to appear that statistical discrimination imposed costs on workers that
exceeded the benefits conferred on employers, then one would think that workers and
employers would have a mutual incentive to eradicate statistical discrimination through
some Pareto optimal agreement. But transactions costs and the inability to harness by
contractual agreement a portion of a worker's future stream of earnings might explain
why such agreements are not voluntarily reached, even when a governmental proscrip-
tion of statistical discrimination would be efficient.
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case, the only effect of banning this form of discrimination is to impose
the information burden on employers, which reduces the net benefits of
the Act by $234 million."2 In the base case, these changes do not affect
the finding of the efficiency of the Act unless one also assumes that the
administration costs of $300 million per year will also continue forever.
92 The amount $23.4 million per year forever implies a net present value of
23.4/.1 = $234 million.
19871

